Reform of the Bank of England argues that the Bank of England's focus on monetary policy meant that it was not prepared for the impact of the freezing up of the financial markets and the collapse of some of the UK’s biggest banks. The report argues that without major reform to the Bank, the new financial regulatory regime currently going through Parliament risks being as flawed as its predecessor.

All company directors should be forced to repay bonuses if they underperform. Executive Compensation advocates introducing “clawbacks” to all bonus contracts as the best way to end rewards for failure in the boardroom. Clawback would also be an effective way of ensuring shareholders are able to reduce the outgoing pay of a poor performing director who had decided to resign.

Shareholder votes on executive pay packages should only become binding if a company fails to secure the necessary threshold of votes in two consecutive years. In a response to the BIS consultation on executive compensation, James Barty says the government’s proposals to make shareholder votes on remuneration policy binding is an overreaction.

Sovereign default has become a reality in Greece with profound implications for the rest of the Euro Area and the international financial system. This paper looks at what lessons can be learnt by examining the last major sovereign default in Argentina 2002.

This report makes recommendations for a policy framework that can identify and monitor of early warning indicators that signal increased vulnerability in the financial system, and that can rapidly employ policy tools to address these vulnerabilities.

Bank Creditors, Moral Hazard and Systemic Risk Regulation argues that there should be a semi-automatic procedure to recapitalise troubled banks whereby bank bonds are converted into equity.

Incentivising boring banking argues that deposit insurance in a fractional banking reserve system is economically damaging and financially destabilising (as it encourages excessive risk-taking by the banks), but politically impossible to avoid.

Fighting Fraud and Financial Crime, recommends the consolidation of existing investigation and prosecution powers from the disparate agencies involved into a single new ‘Financial Crimes Enforcement Agency’, overseen by the Attorney General.

Published soon after the announcement of the European Systemic Risk Board, Financial Instability: are Counter Cyclical Capital Controls the answer? looks at how Counter Cyclical Capital Controls (CCCCs) could work in the UK.